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Abstract
Crashes have fascinated and baffled many canny observers of financial markets. In
the strict orthodoxy of the efficient market theory, crashes must be due to sudden
changes of the fundamental valuation of assets. However, detailed empirical studies
suggest that large price jumps cannot be explained by news and are the result of
endogenous feedback loops. Although plausible, a clear-cut empirical evidence for
such a scenario is still lacking. Here we show how crashes are conditioned by the
market liquidity, for which we propose a new measure inspired by recent theories of
market impact and based on readily available, public information. Our results open
the possibility of a dynamical evaluation of liquidity risk and early warning signs of
market instabilities, and could lead to a quantitative description of the mechanisms
leading to market crashes.
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1 Introduction
Why do market prices move? This simple question has fuelled fifty years of academic debate,
reaching a climax with the 2013 Nobel prize in economics, split between Fama and Shiller who
promote radically different views on the question [32]. Whereas Fama argues that markets
are efficient and prices faithfully reflect fundamental values, Shiller has shown that prices
fluctuate much more than what efficient market theory would suggest, and has insisted on the
role of behavioural biases as a source of excess volatility and price anomalies. Of particular
importance is the origin of the largest changes in prices, aka market crashes, that may have
dire consequences not only for market participants but also for the society as a whole [35]. It
is fair to say that after centuries of market folly [25, 22, 34, 30], there is no consensus on this
issue. Many studies [15, 21, 11] have confirmed the insight of Cutler, Poterba & Summers [12]
who concluded that [t]he evidence that large market moves occur on days without identifiable
major news casts doubts on the view that price movements are fully explicable by news....
The fact that markets appear to crash in the absence of any remarkable event suggests that
destabilising feedback loops of behavioural origin may be at play [33, 24, 20, 7]. Although
plausible, a clear-cut empirical evidence for such an endogenous scenario is still lacking.
After all, crashes are not that frequent and a convincing statistical analysis is difficult, in
particular because of the lack of relevant data about the dynamics of supply and demand
during these episodes.
In this respect, the Bitcoin [29, 1, 6] market is quite unique on many counts. In particular,
the absence of any compelling way to assess the fundamental price of Bitcoins makes the
behavioral hypothesis highly plausible. For our purpose, the availability of the full order
book1 at all times provides precious insights, in particular before and during extreme events.
Indeed, at variance with most financial markets where participants hide their intentions, the
orders are placed long in advance by Bitcoin traders over large price ranges. Using two highly
informative data-sets – the trade-by-trade MtGox data between December 2011 and January
2014, and the full order book data over the same period – we analyse in depth the liquidity of
the Bitcoin market. We find that what caused the crash was not the selling pressure per se,
but rather the dearth of buyers that stoked the panic. Following up on this observation, we
show that three different liquidity measures that aim at quantifying the presence of buyers
(or sellers) are highly correlated and correctly predict the amplitude of potential crashes.
Whereas two of them are direct probes of the prevailing liquidity but difficult to access on
financial markets, the third one – which is also firmly anchored theoretically [14] – only
uses readily available, public information on traded volumes and volatility, and is therefore
a promising candidate for monitoring the propensity of a market to crash.
2 Anatomy of April 10, 2013 crash
Amongst all crashes that happened on the Bitcoin and for which we found some data, the
April 10, 2013 crash is probably the most interesting one since on that day the price dropped
by more than 50% of its value in a few hours. At that time, MtGox was by far the leading
1The order book is the record of all intentions to buy or sell at a given point in time, each volume coming
with an offering price.
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exchange (its market share was over 80% on the BTC/USD spot market) so our data-set
captures a large fraction of the investors’ behaviour. Intuitively, the main driver of market
crashes is the mismatch between the aggregate market order flow imbalance (O, defined
below) that becomes strongly negative and the prevailing liquidity on the buy side, i.e. the
density of potential buyers below the current price. Whereas the former quantity can be
easily reconstructed from the series of trades, the notion of “prevailing liquidity” is only at
best ambiguous. It is only when the price starts heading down, that one expects most of
the interested buyers to declare themselves and post orders in the order book. Therefore,
the liquidity cannot in principle be directly inferred from the information on the publicly
available order book. The dynamic nature of liquidity has been clearly evidenced [38, 8],
and has led to the notion of “latent” liquidity that underpins recent theories of impact in
financial markets [37, 26, 27, 14].
However, Bitcoin is quite an exceptional market in this respect, since a large fraction of
the liquidity is not latent, but actually posted in the order book – possibly resulting from less
strategic participants on a still exotic market – and thus directly observable (see Fig. 1). A
more quantitative analysis indeed shows that typically 30−40% of the volume traded during
the day is already present in the order book in the morning. This is to be compared with a
ratio below 1% on more traditional financial markets, say stocks 2. This allows us to test in
detail the respective roles of aggregate imbalance and liquidity in the triggering of market
crashes. We first study the “aggressive” order flow defined as the aggregated imbalance of
market orders for every 4 hours window between January 2013 and August 2013. In fact,
two definitions are possible. One is defined as the average of the signed number of Bitcoin
contracts sent as market orders3 OB =
∑
i iqi, where each i is a different market order of
sign i (i = +1 for buyer-initiated trades and −1 for seller-initiated trades) and number of
contracts qi, and the sum runs over consecutive trades in a 4 hour window. The second is the
volume imbalance expressed in USD: O$ =
∑
i iqipi, where pi is the i-th transaction price.
These two quantities are shown in Fig. 2 and reveal that (a) large sell episodes are more
intense than large buy episodes; (b) when expressed in Bitcoin, the sell-off that occurred
on April, 10 (of order of 30,000 BTC on a 4h window) is not more spectacular than several
other sell-offs that happened before or after that day; (c) however, when expressed in USD,
the April 10 sell-off indeed appears as an outlier.
The difference between OB and O$ originates from the fact that a large fraction of this
selling activity occurred at the peak of the “bubble” that preceded the crash, see Fig. 3,
top. The BTC price rose from $13 in early January to $260 just before the crash. In Fig. 3,
we represent a “support” level p40kS such that the total quantity of buy orders between p
40k
S
and the current price pt is 40,000 BTC, see Fig. 1. One notices that the price dramatically
departed from the support price during the pre-crash period, which is a clear sign that
Bitcoin price was engaged in a bubble. Although the liquidity expressed in USD was actually
increasing during that period (see Fig. 3, middle), the BTC price increased even faster,
resulting in a thinner and thinner liquidity on the buy side of the order book expressed in
BTC, see Fig. 3, bottom. This scenario is precisely realised in some Agent Based Models of
2The total volume in the order book of major stocks is 5-10 times the volume at the best quotes, which
is itself ∼ 10−3 of the daily turnover, see e.g. [39].
3A market order is an order to trade immediately at the best available price. Because of this need for
immediacy, one often refers to them as aggressive orders.
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Figure 1: Instantaneous cumulated order book. Snapshot of the cumulated supply and
demand displayed on the order book taken on March 8, 2013, with a graphical representation
of the order book liquidity LOB(φ) defined in Def. 1.
markets [18].
The conclusion of the above analysis, that may appear trivial, is that the crash occurred
because the price was too high, and buyers too scarce to resist the pressure of a sell-off. More
interesting is the fact that the knowledge of the volume present in the order book allows one
to estimate an expected price drop of ≈ 50% in the event of a large – albeit not extreme –
sell-off. Of course, the possibility to observe the full demand curve (or a good approximation
thereof) is special to the Bitcoin market, and not available in more mainstream markets
where the publicly displayed liquidity is only of order 1% of the total daily traded volume.
Still, as we show now, one can built accurate proxies of the latent liquidity using observable
quantities only, opening the path to early warning signs of an impeding crash.
3 Three definitions of “liquidity”
More formally, the market liquidity measure discussed above is defined as:
Definition 1 The order-book liquidity LOB(φ) (on the buy side) is such that (cf. Fig. 1
above): ∫ pt
pt(1−φ)
dpρ(p, t) := LOB(φ) , (1)
(and similarly for the sell-side). In the above equation, pt is the price at time t and ρ(p, t)
is the density of demand that is materialised on the order book at price p and at time t.
Conversely, the price drop −φ∗pt expected if a large instantaneous sell-off of size Q∗
occurs is such that:
φ∗ = L−1OB(Q∗), (2)
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Figure 2: Order flow imbalances in USD and BTC. Top: Aggressive imbalance in order
flow
∑
i ivi (where i = ±1 is the sign of the transaction, and vi its volume in Bitcoins),
aggregated over periods of 4 hours between January 2013 and August 2013, expressed in Bit-
coins. April 10, 2013 (for which the realised imbalance is represented as a dashed horizontal
line) does not appear as an outlier. Bottom: aggressive imbalance in order flow
∑
i ivipi,
aggregated over periods of 4 hours between January 2013 and August 2013 and expressed in
USD. April 10, 2013 now clearly appears as an outlier.
where L−1OB is a measure of illiquidity.
An a posteriori comparison between realised returns and the liquidity-adjusted imbalance
for the 14 most extreme negative returns that have occurred between Jan 1, 2013 and Apr
10, 2013 is shown in Fig. 4. These events, which corresponds to dramatic jumps in the
cumulated order flow process, are found to have a characteristic scale of about 4h with a
standard deviation of 2.5h, justifying the choice made in Fig. 2 to plot imbalances at a 4h
time scale. The analysis shows that the quantity L−1OB(OB) nearly perfectly matches crashes
amplitudes, vindicating the hypothesis that most of the liquidity is indeed present in the
visible order book for the Bitcoin.
However, as recalled above, the visible order book on standard financial markets usually
contains a minute fraction of the real intentions of the agents. Therefore the use of LOB(φ)
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Figure 3: Liquidity and support price. Top: Actual price pt (blue) vs. support price
p40kS (red) defined as the price that would be reached if a typical sell-off of 40,000 BTC
was to occur instantaneously. Note that p40kS is ≈ 50% below the price pt just before the
crash, explaining the order of magnitude of the move that happened that day. Middle (resp.
Bottom): Buy volume LOB(φ) in USD (resp. BTC) in the order book, during the months
preceding the crash of April 10, 2013, measured as the volume between the current price pt
and pt(1−φ) where φ = 10%, 20% and 50%. One can see that for any quantile the liquidity
in USD tended to increase by an overall factor ' 2 during the period, while the liquidity in
BTC was decreased by a factor ' 2− 3 as an immediate consequence of the bubble.
deduced from the observable order book would lead to a tremendous underestimation of
the liquidity in these markets [31, 38]. Liquidity is in fact a dynamic notion, that reveals
itself progressively as a reaction (possibly with some lag) to the incoming order flow [38, 8].
Another definition of liquidity, that accounts for the progressive appearance of the latent
liquidity as orders are executed, is based on a measure of market impact. With enough
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Figure 4: Forecast of crashes amplitudes using order book volumes. For the 14
most extreme negative returns that have occurred between Jan 1, 2013 and Apr 10, 2013, we
compare the realised return with: (Left) the net imbalance OB during the period (usually
a few hours) and (Right) the liquidity-adjusted imbalance L−1OB(OB). This illustrates the
relevance of the LOB liquidity measure to predict the amplitudes of crashes – even in the
most extreme cases.
statistics, the average (relative) price move I(Q) = 〈∆p/p〉 induced by the execution of
a meta-order4 can be measured as a function of their total volume Q. Since these meta-
orders are executed on rather long time scales (compared to the transaction frequency), it is
reasonable to think that their impact reveals the “true” latent liquidity of markets [37, 26,
27, 14]. This leads us to a second definition of liquidity, based on market impact:
Definition 2 The impact liquidity LI(φ) is defined as the volume of a meta-order that
moves, on average, the price pt by ±φpt, or, more precisely, LI(φ) is fixed by the condition:
I(LI(φ)) = φ, (3)
since the impact I(Q) is usually measured in relative terms. As above, the price drop expected
if a large sell-off of volume imbalance Q∗ occurs is simply given by L−1I (Q∗) = I(Q∗).
The problem with this second definition is that it requires proprietary data with suffi-
cient statistics, available only to brokerage firms or to active asset managers/hedge funds. It
turns out to be also available for Bitcoin [13] – see below. However, a very large number of
empirical studies in the last 15 years have established that the impact of meta-orders follows
an extremely robust “square-root law” [36, 2, 28, 13, 5, 37, 23, 4, 19, 26, 9]. Namely, inde-
pendently of the asset class, time period, style of trading and micro-structure peculiarities,
one has:
ITH(Q) ≈ Y σd
√
Q
Vd
, (4)
where Y is an a-dimensional constant of order unity, Vd is the daily traded volume and σd
is the daily volatility. This square-root law has now been justified theoretically by several
4A meta-order is a sequence of individual trades generated by the same trading decision but spread out
in time, so as to get a better price and/or not to be detected [37].
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authors, building upon the notion of latent liquidity [37, 26, 27, 14] (see Ref. [16] for an
alternative story). Assuming that the above functional shape of market impact is correct
leads to a third definition of liquidity:
Definition 3 The theoretical liquidity LTH(φ) is the theoretical volume of a meta-order
required to move the price pt by ±φpt according to formula Eq. (4) above, i.e.:
ITH(LTH(φ)) = φ. (5)
Together with Eq. (4), this amounts to consider σd/
√
Vd as a measure of market illiquidity.
Clearly, since both σd and Vd can be estimated from public market data, this last definition of
liquidity is quite congenial. It was proposed in Ref. [10] as a proxy to obtain impact-adjusted
marked-to-market valuation of large portfolios, and tested in Ref. [23] on five stock market
crashes, with very promising results. However, there is quite a leap of faith in assuming
that our above three definitions are – at least approximately – equivalent. This is why the
Bitcoin data is quite unique since it allows one to measure all three liquidities LOB,LI,LTH
and test quantitatively that they do indeed reveal the very same information.
4 Comparing the liquidity measures
We measured the order book liquidity LOB at the daily scale by averaging the volume present
at all prices in the buy side of the order book for each day. The empirical impact is obtained
following Ref. [13] by measuring the full I(Q), obtained as an average over all meta-orders
of a given volume Q on a given day. Finally, the theoretical impact Eq. (4) is obtained by
measuring both the traded volume of the day Vd and the corresponding volatility σd
5. The
daily scale has been chosen so as to average out market noise and intraday patterns in the
measure of L−1I and L−1TH, while remaining reactive to liquidity fluctuations: Fig. 3 indeed
shows how much liquidity can fluctuate in a few days.
These three estimates allow us to compare, as a function of time (between November
2012 and November 2013) the expected price drop for a large sell meta-order of size – say –
Q∗ = 40, 000 BTC, see Fig. 5. We have rescaled by a constant factor the predictions based
on LI and LTH, so as to match the average levels. The agreement is quite striking, and shown
in a different way in Fig. 6 as a scatter plot of L−1OB vs L−1I or L−1TH, either on the same day,
or with a one day lag. As coinciding times, the R2 of the regressions are ≈ 0.86 and only
fall to ≈ 0.83 with a day lag, meaning that one can use past data to predict the liquidity of
tomorrow. As a comparison, when using instead Amihud’s [3] measure of illiquidity σd/Vd,
one obtains R2 of resp. 0.74 and 0.71.
That the estimates based on LI and LTH match is no surprise since the square-root
law was already tested with a high degree of precision on the Bitcoin [13]. But that the
theoretical measure of liquidity LTH based on easily accessible market data is able to track
so closely the information present in the whole order book is truly remarkable, and suggests
that one can indeed faithfully use LTH on markets where reliable information on the latent
order book is absent (as is the case for most markets).
5defined as σ2d =
1
T
∑T
t=1
(
0.5ln (Ht/Lt)
2 − (2ln(2)− 1) ln (Ct/Ot)2
)
where Ot/Ht/Lt/Ct are the
open/high/low/close prices of the sub-periods [17].
8
-140
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
11/2012 01/2013 03/2013 05/2013 07/2013 09/2013 11/2013
%
of
d
ro
p
if
a
ty
p
ic
al
se
ll
-o
ff
h
ap
p
en
s
Time
I(Q)/
√
Q (L−1I )
σd/
√
Vd (L−1TH)
Liquidity (L−1OB)
Figure 5: Comparison between the three (il-)iquidity measures. Parallel evolution
of the three price drops φ∗ deduced from our three estimates of illiquidity L−1OB,L−1I ,L−1TH
defined above. The estimates based on L−1I ,L−1TH have been rescaled by a factor 6.104 to
match the average order book data prediction.
5 Discussion – Anticipating crashes?
Thanks to the unique features of the Bitcoin market, we have been able to investigate
some of the factors that determine the propensity of a market to crash. Two main features
emerge from our study. First, the price level should lie within a range where the underlying
demand (resp. supply) is able to support large – but expected – fluctuations in supply (resp.
demand). When the price is clearly out of bounds (for example the pre-April 2013 period for
Bitcoin) the market is unambiguously in a precarious state that can be called a bubble. Our
main result allows one to make the above idea meaningful in practice. We show that three
natural liquidity measures (based, respectively, on the knowledge of the full order book, on
the average impact of meta-orders, and on the ratio of the volatility to the square-root of
the traded volume, σd/
√
Vd) are highly correlated and do predict the amplitude of a putative
crash induced by a given (large) sell order imbalance.
Since the latter measure is entirely based on readily available public information, our
result is quite remarkable. It opens the path to a better understanding of crash mechanisms
and possibly to early warning signs of market instabilities. However, while we claim that the
amplitude of a potential crash can be anticipated, we are of course not able to predict when
this crash will happen – if it happens at all. Still, our analysis motivates better dynamical
risk evaluations (like value-at-risk), impact adjusted marked-to-market accounting [10] or
liquidity-sensitive option valuation models. As a next step, a comprehensive study of the
correlation between the realised crash probability and σd/
√
Vd on a wider universe of stocks –
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respectively: 0.9, 0.95, 0.87 and 0.93.
expanding the work of Ref. [23] – would be a highly valuable validation of the ideas discussed
here.
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